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Does California’s Senate Bill 1368, which requires all long-term
utility contracts with power generators to meet a greenhouse gas
emission standard, violate the dormant Commerce Clause? The law will
affect the interstate trade of electric power, but will that effect allow a
constitutional challenge to S.B. 1368 and others like it to succeed? What
are the arguments that will be made in a potential challenge, and what
would be the likely ruling?
I. INTRODUCTION
Recent proposals to limit greenhouse gases (GHGs) on the
federal level, including cap-and-trade systems, have failed. 1 The
Lieberman-Warner bill2 was the most likely to succeed but failed to
make it to a Senate floor vote in June 2008.3 While this failure may
have reflected poorly on the chances of passing federal climate-change
legislation, most commentators see it as a sign that Congress will send a
bill with more stringent requirements to the President before the end of
2009.4 As of this writing, the U.S. House of Representatives had passed
a climate-change bill with a stringent matching bill working its way
through the Senate.5 Commentators have questioned whether the current
bill could be passed before the 2010 Copenhagen summit on climate
change, a feat that would be important for those urging the United States
to lead the way on international climate policy.6 However, the shape of
such a climate bill is uncertain and likely to undergo multiple

1. Zachary Coile, Climate Bill’s Defeat Sets Stage for Tough Round 2, S.F. CHRON.,
June 7, 2008, at A2; See Haik Gugarats, U.S. House Greenhouse Bill Even Tougher Than
Lieberman-Warner, GAS PROCESSORS REP., June 11, 2008, available at 2008 WLNR
11486328; Margot Roosevelt, Trying to Reset Climate Clock, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 16, 2008,
at B1.
2. Lieberman-Warner Climate Security Act of 2007, S. 2191, 110th Cong. (2008).
For a brief discussion of the bill, see infra note 173.
3. David M. Herszenhorn, After Verbal Fire, Senate Effectively Kills Climate
Change Bill, N.Y. TIMES, June 7, 2008, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/07/
washington/07climate.html; Gugarats, supra note 1.
4. John Broder, Senate Opens Debate on Politically Risky Bill Addressing Global
Warming, N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 2008, at A16; Herszenhorn, supra note 3; Gugarats, supra
note 1.
5. Louis Charbonneau & Gerard Wynn, Obama’s Climate-Change Hopes Get a
Boost, REUTERS, Oct. 12, 2009, http://www.reuters.com/article/environmentNews/idUSN
1252318120091012?feedType=RSS&feedName=environmentNews.
6. Id.; see Jim Tankersley, Obama Moves Forward with Plan to Cut Emissions,
L.A. TIMES, Jan. 25, 2009, at A11, available at http://articles.latimes.com/2009/jan/25/nation/
na-climate-econ25 (discussing that a cap-and-trade bill was passed in the House and is
estimated to make it to the Senate for discussion in late 2009).
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reformations before the end of 2009.7 One of the most important features
of the bill will be the role of states in limiting GHGs.
Nearly all stakeholders in the debate prefer federal action on GHG
emissions. Environmental and public interest groups desire as large of a
cut in GHG emissions as possible and see federal legislation as the only
appropriate means to lower U.S. emissions as a whole.8 The scientific
community agrees, claiming that because climate change acts on a global
scale, any state is far too small of a contributor to make a perceptible
impact on its own.9 Business groups have largely accepted regulation as
inevitable and are calling for clear, national standards rather than a
patchwork of different regulations for each state.10 In the absence of
such federal legislation, California and other states have passed laws
aimed at reducing statewide GHG emissions. While it is settled that the
federal government can preempt states on this issue,11 the question is
whether the Constitution allows states to act on such an enormous
problem in the federal government’s absence.
California’s Global Warming Solutions Act (A.B. 32)12 grabbed many
headlines in 2006 because of the GHG-reduction targets it established.13
But for many in the electricity industry, 2006’s Greenhouse Gas
Emissions Performance Standard (S.B. 1368)14 was actually the more

7. Nathaniel Gronewold, Sen. Boxer Says Obama Admin Could Make Climate
Pledge in Copenhagen, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 2009, available at http://www.nytimes.com/
gwire/2009/10/12/12greenwire-sen-boxer-says-obama-admin-could-make-climate-39754.html.
8. RICK DUKE & DAN LASHOF, THE NEW ENERGY ECONOMY: PUTTING AMERICA
ON THE PATH TO SOLVING GLOBAL WARMING 8 (2008), http://nrdc.org/globalWarming/
energy/eeconomy.pdf (arguing that federal government must act to have an impact on global
warming).
9. Alice Kaswan, The Domestic Response to Global Climate Change: What Role
for Federal, State, and Litigation Initiatives?, 42 U.S.F. L. REV. 39, 67-73 (2007).
10. DUKE & LASHOF, supra note 8, at 10 (“Twenty-seven major U.S. corporations—
including industry giants such as General Electric, General Motors, DuPont,
AIG, Caterpillar, and Shell—have joined the NRDC and other nonprofit organizations to
form the U.S. Climate Action Partnership (USCAP) to advocate for federal legislation to
cut emissions by 60 to 80 percent by 2050.”).
11. See The Supremacy Clause, U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
12. California Global Warming Solutions Act, Assemb. 32, 2005-2006 (Cal. 2006).
13. Mark Martin, A Global Warming Moment, S.F. CHRONICLE, Sept. 28, 2006, at
A-1, available at http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2006/09/28/WARMING.
TMP; Josh Richman, Governor Signs Historic Bill to Reduce Greenhouse Gases,
OAKLAND TRIB., Sept. 28, 2006, available at, http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qn4176/
is_20060928/ai_n16765531/?tag=content;col1.
14. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE §§ 8340-41 (West 2009).
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significant piece of legislation.15 S.B. 1368 prevents all California utilities,
both privately and publicly owned, from signing long-term contracts
with a power plant that produces more greenhouse gases per unit of
power than the prevailing natural-gas standard—set at 1,100 pounds of
carbon dioxide per megawatt hour.16 California’s climate action closely
follows the timeline and standards established by the Kyoto Protocol,17
leading some to argue that California’s legislation was the State’s way of
indirectly “signing” the treaty, despite the legal restraints that would
otherwise prohibit such an action.18
One major hurdle for California legislators in drafting A.B. 32 and
S.B. 1368 was striking a realistic balance between GHG reduction and
effective enforcement.19 S.B. 1368’s stated goal was to demonstrate
leadership regarding the “sustainability of our planet.”20 Legislators and
commentators work under the general assumption that strict regulations
on in-state carbon emissions will lead industries to relocate to nearby
states, where loose or non-existent carbon rules allow for cheaper energy
production.21 Legislators did not want to act in a way that would hurt

15. Rich Saskal, California Public Utilities Feeling the Effects of Greenhouse Gas
Bill, 258 BOND BUYER 34, Dec. 22, 2006; Lyn Corum, Governor Schwarzenegger Signs
Legislation that Will Limit Coal-Fired Imports into California, GLOBAL POWER REP.,
Oct. 5, 2006, at 23; John Myers, The Other Greenhouse Gas Bill…, CAPITAL NOTES, Sept. 27,
2006, http://blogs.kqed.org/capitalnotes/2006/09/27/the-other-greenhouse-gas-bill-2/.
16. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 8341(b)(1)-(d)(2). The Greenhouse Gases Emission
Standard requires the PUC to set the performance standard at “no higher than the rate of
emissions of greenhouse gases for combined-cycle natural gas baseload generation.”
CAL. PUBL. UTIL. COMM’N, PUC SETS GHG EMISSIONS PERFORMANCE STANDARD TO
HELP MITIGATE CLIMATE CHANGE, Jan. 25, 2007, http://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/published/
News_release/63997.htm; see CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 8341(d)(1). Notably, this standard
only would restrict coal-fired power plants.
17. The California standards called for larger cuts than the original Kyoto Protocol.
See U.K. and California: Environmental Pals, Blair and Schwarzenegger to Consider
Methods to Reduce Greenhouse Gases, INT’L HERALD TRIB., Aug. 1, 2006, at 10
[hereinafter Environmental Pals].
18. Margot Roosevelt, California Offers to Lead on Climate Change Fight, L.A.
TIMES, Nov. 20, 2008, at A22; Samantha Young, Schwarzenegger Opens Climate
Summit with Obama, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Nov. 19, 2008. States cannot sign international
treaties, as it would violate the foreign affairs power. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
19. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 8341(b)(1)-(d)(2); CAL. PUBL. UTIL. COMM’N, PUC
SETS GHG EMISSIONS PERFORMANCE STANDARD TO HELP MITIGATE CLIMATE CHANGE,
Jan. 25, 2007, http://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/published/News_release/63997.htm; Environmental
Pals, supra note 17.
20. Judy Lin, Some Legislators Thinking Green: Democrats Pushing Bills, Opposed by
Business, on Water and Air Quality, SACRAMENTO BEE, July 2, 2006 (quoting thenAssembly Speaker Fabian Nunez, D-Los Angeles).
21. This phenomenon is generally referred to as “race to the bottom.” For a
discussion of the novelty of California’s “bottom-up” regulation of an issue that at most
requires a “top-down” solution, see Kaswan, supra note 9, at 62-64; Kirsten Engel, State
and Local Climate Change Initiatives: What Is Motivating State and Local Governments
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the State economically, especially if they only shuffled around certain
power contracts without a net drop in GHG emissions.22 This concept is
referred to as “leakage,” meaning that to the extent that carbon emissions
in California are reduced, those reductions would move or “leak” into
other states that have little or no GHG regulations.23 This would even
out any in-state reductions to a large-scale net reduction of zero.
To reduce leakage, California legislators aimed to regulate the power
that the state consumes, not just what it produces in-state. Currently
18.2% of electricity consumed in California comes from coal. 24
However, over 90% of California’s coal-fired power is imported from
other states, which makes regulating coal emissions problematic.25
Because of this system, for California to lessen the amount of emissions,
it must change the type of power its utilities buy from out-of-state
generators, which creates a potential dormant Commerce Clause
challenge. For S.B. 1368 to withstand scrutiny, California will have to
show that the law is not facially discriminatory, the goal is legitimate,
there is no easier or localized solution, and the value of S.B. 1368
outweighs the burdens it places on the interstate power market.
This Article addresses whether S.B. 1368 could hold up to a
Commerce Clause challenge in three stages. Part II discusses the dormant
Commerce Clause and how it is applied to state laws that potentially
affect interstate commerce. It explains the history and development of
the concept and fleshes out the two-step test that exists today: (1) courts
determine whether a law is facially discriminatory; (2) if not, courts
apply a test that weighs the respective burdens and benefits of the law.
to Address a Global Problem and What Does This Say About Federalism and
Environmental Law?, 38 URB. LAW. 1015, 1020-22 (2006).
22. Douglas A. Kysar & Bernadette A. Meyler, Like a Nation State, 55 UCLA L.
REV. 1621, 1670-71 (2008).
23. For a full discussion of free-riding—non-regulating states benefiting from GHG
reductions in regulated states—and leakage, see Cary Coglianese & Jocelyn D’Ambrosio,
Policymaking Under Pressure: The Perils of Incremental Responses to Climate Change,
40 CONN. L. REV. 1411, 1419-20 (2008); Joseph Allan MacDougald, Why Climate Law
Must Be Federal: The Clash Between Commerce Clause Jurisprudence and State
Greenhouse Gas Trading Systems, 40 CONN. L. REV. 1431, 1437, 1446-47 (2008);
Benjamin Sovacool, The Best of Both Worlds: Environmental Federalism and the Need
for Federal Action on Renewable Energy and Climate Change, 27 STAN. ENVTL. L.J.
397, 465-68 (2008).
24. MICHAEL NYBERG ET AL., CAL. ENERGY COMM’N, 2008 NET SYSTEM POWER
REPORT 5 (2009), http://www.energy.ca.gov/2009publications/CEC-200-2009-010/CEC200-2009-010-CMF.PDF.
25. Id.
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Part II also discusses the different ways in which many of the current
Supreme Court Justices interpret and apply the dormant Commerce Clause.
Part III applies the current interpretations and tests of the dormant
Commerce Clause to S.B. 1368. Part IV addresses some of the policy
considerations involved in the federal and state intersection. States
should be allowed to impose their own climate-change laws and to set
their own caps, following the model of cooperative federalism. This
Article concludes by noting that while legislation like S.B. 1368 may not
be the best solution to global warming, in the absence of federal
legislation, it amounts to legitimate state action. Further, S.B. 1368
serves as a role model that will hopefully inspire a cooperative
federalism model.
II. THE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE
The dormant Commerce Clause is based on an interpretation of
Article I, section 8 of the Constitution, which grants Congress the ability
to legislate on interstate commerce.26 While the Commerce Clause
clearly states that only the federal government can regulate interstate
trade, courts have understood a “negative” or “dormant” aspect to this
restraint.27 This suggests that even without federal action, states have no
right to legislate in areas that affect interstate commerce.28 The federal
government’s singular power to affect interstate trade came as a result of
the economic Balkanization and retaliatory state tariffs in the United
States under the Articles of Confederation.29 The framers wanted to
show that the United States’ “economic unit is the Nation, which alone
has the gamut of powers necessary to control the economy.”30 Courts
have carved a major exception to this rule—the market participant
doctrine, which excludes all state action from the dormant Commerce
Clause when the state is acting in the market as a participant and not a
regulator.31
26. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
27. Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 98 (1994).
28. Id.
29. Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 325-36 (1979).
30. H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 537 (1949); see also
Baldwin v. G. A. F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 523 (1935) (“The Constitution was
framed . . . upon the theory that the peoples of the several states must sink or swim together,
and that in the long run prosperity and salvation are in union and not division.”); THE
FEDERALIST No. 22 (Alexander Hamilton) (describing how the Constitution was meant to
prevent local protectionism as a form of retaliation).
31. Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 803, 809-10 (1976); see also
Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 588-89 (1997);
White v. Mass. Council of Const. Employers, Inc., 460 U.S. 204, 206-08 (1983); Reeves,
Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 436-37 (1980).
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The test used to identify a dormant Commerce Clause violation has
undergone significant change over its lifetime. Scholars, judges, and
commentators have argued for a one-,32 two-,33 and three-tiered34 tests.
Courts generally now apply a two-tiered test and take many relevant
factors into the second tier.35 First, a court must decide whether a law is
facially discriminatory, evidenced by a different standard for in- and outof-state businesses “that benefits the former and burdens the latter.”36
Then if the law is found to be facially discriminatory, it is subjected to
strict scrutiny,37 under which a court looks for extraordinary reasons for
the local regulation.38 Strict scrutiny is as tough as it sounds, and is
sometimes referred to as the “per se” test because, for all practical
purposes, the law becomes per se invalid if it is found to be facially
discriminatory.39 If the regulation at issue is not invalidated by the first
part of the test, the court asks a second question, which is whether the
law serves a legitimate local purpose and is applied in a rational manner;
then the court must rule based on whether the regulation places an
“undue burden” on commerce.40
A. Testing for Violations of the Dormant Commerce Clause
Under part one of the dormant Commerce Clause test, laws that are
facially discriminatory towards out-of-state interests are struck down. If
32. Justices Scalia looks only for facial discrimination, discussed infra Part I(a).
33. This is referred to as the Pike test, which looks for facial discrimination, then if
none is found, weighs the respective interests. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137,
142 (1970).
34. This test is different from the Pike test in that it removes the test for alternative
methods, legitimate purpose, or rational relationship from the Pike test and examines the
factor on its own.
35. See United Haulers Ass’n, Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth.,
550 U.S. 330, 338, 345, 347 (2007); C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511
U.S. 383, 389-90 (1994). While both cases rest heavily on a public/private distinction,
they also support a two-tiered test.
36. Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 99 (1994); see
also Daniel A. Farber, Climate Change, Federalism, and the Constitution, 50 ARIZ. L.
REV. 879, 894 (2008).
37. Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 578–
79 (1986).
38. See United Haulers, 550 U.S. at 353-54.
39. David S. Day, The Expanded Concept of Facial Discrimination in the Dormant
Commerce Clause Doctrine, 40 CREIGHTON L. REV. 497, 498 n.3 (2007) (noting only one
discriminatory law has passed this test).
40. Carbone, 511 U.S. at 390; Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142
(1970).
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the legislative intent is to put out-of-state interests at a disadvantage,
even to a small extent,41 the law cannot pass strict scrutiny.42 For
instance, regulations barring milk depots from shipping out-of-state,43
controlling the exportation of minnows,44 and keeping packaging or any
type of processing in-state,45 have all been struck down as facially
discriminatory because their drafters’ intention was to put out-of-state
interests at a disadvantage solely because of their location. If the intent
of the law was not to discriminate against out-of-state interests, it is put
to the balancing test developed in Pike.46 In this test, the burden on
interstate commerce imposed by the regulation is weighed against the
state interest in regulation; if the benefit to the state is weak or the
impact on trade strong, the regulation is usually struck down.47 The Pike
Court put forth the following statement of the law: “Where the statute
regulates evenhandedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest,
and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be
upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly
excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.”48 In weighing the
burden and benefits in the second part of the Pike test, courts examine
many aspects of the law in question.
The “burden” is given weight by first looking to see if there are
alternatives that would accomplish the state goal without imposing on

41. See New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269-70, 276 (1988) (“Where
discrimination is patent . . . neither a widespread advantage to in-state interests nor a
widespread disadvantage to out-of-state competitors need be shown.”); Pike, 397 U.S. at
142; Richard C. Schragger, Cities, Economic Development, and the Free Trade
Constitution, 94 VA. L. REV. 1091, 1117-18 (2008) (discussing the development of the
“undue burden” test from the “barriers to trade” test).
42. Only one law has passed the test. See Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 151
(1986) (ruling a law banning baitfish from out-of-state, while discriminatory, was still
valid because of the threat posed to the environment by the fish).
43. H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 544-545 (1949).
44. Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 336-38 (1979). Contra Taylor, 447 U.S.
131 (law banning baitfish). The threat that the out-of-state fish posed to survival of the
local fish was the difference in these cases.
45. E.g., S.-Cent. Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 84 (1984) (timber);
Pike, 397 U.S. at 139, 142 (melons).
46. Pike, 397 U.S. at 142. This test has roots in Southern Pacific v. Arizona, 325
U.S. 761, 779-80 (1945) (striking an Arizona requirement that cantaloupes grown instate had to be packaged before transported out-of-state).
47. Pike, 397 U.S. at 142 (“[T]he question becomes one of degree. And the extent
of the burden that will be tolerated will of course depend on the nature of the local
interest involved . . . .”); see also New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 278
(1988) (“The Commerce Clause does not prohibit all state action designed to give its
residents an advantage in the marketplace, but only action of that description in
connection with the State’s regulation of interstate commerce.”).
48. Pike, 397 U.S. at 142 (citing Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit,
362 U.S. 440, 443 (1960)).
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interstate commerce.49 If it can be shown that there is a cheaper and
easier way to remedy the target problem without burdening interstate
commerce, courts will give the law very little deference when applying
the Pike test.50 For example, in Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co.,
Minnesota was allowed to ban all plastic milk cartons because they
caused problems in landfills, wasted energy, and generally “deplete[d]
natural resources.”51 The Court could not find an “approach with ‘a lesser
impact on interstate activities’” that would have accomplished Minnesota’s
valid goal of protecting natural resources, so it applied the Pike test.52
In conceptualizing the burden on interstate commerce, courts also
examine who the burden falls upon. In Clover Leaf, most Minnesota
milk carton producers used paperboard, not plastic, so they and would
not be burdened by the law.53 Therefore, the burden would fall on outof-state plastic carton producers, which would normally arouse suspicion
that the law was facially discriminatory. However, the Court found that
the alleged burden on out-of-state milk carton producers was “exaggerated”54
because the account of paper cartons could have come from out-of-state,
and some of the plastic carton manufacturers were in Minnesota.55
Similarly, in United Haulers Ass’n, Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste
Management Authority, the Court found that the burden of a waste49. See id. (“And the extent of the burden that will be tolerated will of
course depend on the nature of the local interest involved, and on whether it could be
promoted as well with a lesser impact on interstate activities.”); Great Atlantic & Pacific
Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366, 375-77 (1976) (finding that where local inspections
could serve purpose of ensuring that local health standards were met, statute permitting
sale of out-of-state milk in Mississippi only if the state of origin allowed sale therein of
Mississippi milk on a reciprocal basis impermissibly burdened commerce); see also
Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 354-55 (1951) (ruling that a regulation
protecting the safety of milk was deemed invalid because there were much better options
available to meet said goal).
50. See Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Adver. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 353-54 (1977)
(finding that North Carolina could have easily used other methods to provide consumers
with certification of apples).
51. See Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 472-74 (1981)
(“Since the statute does not discriminate between interstate and intrastate commerce, the
controlling question is whether the incidental burden imposed on interstate commerce by
the Minnesota Act is ‘clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.’”) (quoting
Pike, 397 U.S. at 142).
52. Id. (citing Pike, 397 U.S. at 142).
53. Id.
54. Id. (citing the inference that some of the replacements for plastic jugs would
come from out-of-state wood, and that plastic would continue to be used, just in different
products).
55. Id.
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processing requirement would be carried by the very citizens that voted
for it, which was evidence that the citizens had judged for themselves
that the benefit was worth the burden.56
The counterbalance to the harm that the burden causes in the Pike test
is the benefit the in-state interests receive from a regulation. In order
give appropriate significance to the benefit, a court looks to whether the
goal of the regulation is a “legitimate local interest.”57 The Clover Leaf
Court ruled that Minnesota had a “substantial state interest in promoting
conservation of energy and other natural resources and easing solid
waste disposal problems”—a goal strong enough to justify the regulatory
scheme.58 Because the Minnesota legislature did not enact the ban to
give an advantage to in-state producers, and since the benefit of less
plastic in landfills was strong, the law was upheld.59
Another factor determining the benefit in the Pike test is whether the
law is “rationally related” to its stated goal. This test exists to prevent
states from passing discriminatory legislation disguised as environmental
or health regulations.60 The Supreme Court has made it clear that there
is a thin line between discriminatory intent and discriminatory effect,
and barring clear evidence of discriminatory intent, it would largely
defer to legislatures.61 The Court did find discriminatory intent in Hunt
v. Washington State Apple Advertising Commission (Washington Apple),
where North Carolina’s apple licensing scheme was created to protect
in-state apple growers because the apples it was trying to keep out were
subject to more stringent testing.62 If health was North Carolina’s
concern, its less stringent requirements were not “rationally related to
their supposed purpose of maintaining apple standards” because

56. United Haulers Ass’n, Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550
U.S. 330, 343 (2007).
57. C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 392-94 (1994)
(ruling that a flow control ordinance meant to finance a waste processor was not within
the bounds of a “legitimate local interest”).
58. Clover Leaf, 449 U.S. at 473.
59. Id. at 471-74.
60. Carbone, 511 U.S. at 393 (stating that there are alternate means to reach the stated
health goal of the garbage flow regulation). A stream of analysis takes place in judging
whether the regulation is the least restrictive option. Christine A. Klein, The Environmental
Commerce Clause, 27 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 57-59 (2003).
61. See New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 276 (1988) (stating that
the effects did not need to weigh heavily on out-of-state interests, that discrimination was
enough); City of Phila. v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 626-27 (1978) (stating that
protectionism is difficult to determine, and in that case, the facially discriminatory
purpose was clear); Walgreen Co. v. Rullan, 405 F.3d 50, 56 (1st Cir. 2005) (finding a
dormant Commerce Clause violation, but only because the law was de jure and de facto
protectionism).
62. Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Adver. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 352-54 (1977).
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Washington’s standards were at least as strong.63 The Court noted that
the effect of the regulation, and most likely its goal, was to protect the
North Carolina market for local apples.64 There was no benefit; thus any
burden at all that the regulation would have on interstate commerce
would fail the Pike test.65
Another aspect of the Pike test is referred to as “extraterritoriality,”
meaning that a state’s regulation controls activities that occur entirely in
other states.66 In Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. N.Y. State Liquor
Authority, the Court struck down a New York law requiring all liquor
sellers to keep their prices in New York at or below the price they
charged anywhere else in the nation.67 While the law regulated liquor
prices in-state, it set that price based on the lowest price in neighboring
states, which effectively regulated liquor prices for the region, not just
New York.68 The Court examined the state law’s impacts and found that
it would result in companies being barred from raising prices anywhere
in the country above what New York had listed; this impermissibly
impacted interstate commerce.69 The goal of securing cheaper prices for
New York residents was not important enough to justify the regulation,
so the law failed the Pike test.70 Brown-Forman, in conjunction with the
Pike analysis, illustrates that states cannot attempt to control commerce
in an action that takes place entirely outside of its borders.71
In applying this Pike test, the Court must weigh the costs and benefits
of regulations while examining their motives and methods. If a law is
not facially discriminatory, courts must examine the law’s relationship to
its purpose and any extraterritorial impacts. Historically, the Court
examines the intent of environmental laws intensely and has invalidated

63. Id.
64. Id. The Court found that the “open space” concerns brought in a dairy-pricing
case were not appropriate environmental concerns and were completely incidental to the
legislative action. See West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 204-05 n.20
(1994).
65. Washington Apple, 432 U.S. at 352-54. The Court also seemed to be particularly
galled by the fact that the law itself came from the state apple lobby. Id.
66. Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 332-33 (1989); Gillian E. Metzger, Congress,
Article IV, and Interstate Relations, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1468, 1522-23 (2007).
67. Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 577,
583-84 (1986).
68. Id.
69. Id. at 581-84.
70. This reasoning was followed in Healy, 491 U.S. at 332-33.
71. Id.; Brown-Forman, 476 U.S. at 581-84.
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environmental restrictions on materials coming both in72 and out73 of
states. To withstand scrutiny, natural resource regulations have to be
appropriately targeted, with statements elucidating their rationales and
intentions to regulate within a state’s borders, for a court to rule that any
effect on interstate commerce is constitutionally permissible.74
B. Current State of the Court on the Dormant Commerce Clause
The current and future Supreme Court’s application of the dormant
Commerce Clause is uncertain,75 especially because the analysis requires
“eschew[ing] formalism for a sensitive, case-by-case analysis of purposes
and effects.”76 Two Supreme Court Justices have clearly stated their
rejection of the Pike test, and one of them would only strike down state
laws that are facially discriminatory.77 Other members of the Court are
split on the application. The most important aspects of any dormant
Commerce Clause question in the current Supreme Court is whether the
law at issue amounts to facial discrimination and what value will be
ascribed to the law under the Pike test.78
Justices Scalia and Thomas will not likely strike down any nondiscriminatory state regulation that has an impact on interstate commerce.
They believe that the interplay between state and federal regulations
should be decided by the respective legislatures.79 Absent stare decisis
concerns, Justice Scalia would invalidate state laws only when they are
clearly facially discriminatory,80 while Justice Thomas believes that

72. City of Phila. v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 627 (1978) (finding that barring
incoming trash is a violation of the dormant Commerce Clause).
73. Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 336-38 (1979) (finding that barring taking
minnows is a violation of the dormant Commerce Clause).
74. Edwin Chemerinsky et al., California, Climate Change and the Constitution,
37 ENVTL L. REV. 10,653, at 10,659 (stating that California strengthens its claim to a
strong state interest in GHG regulation as long as it “compiles a record documenting the
effectiveness of its regulatory measures in accomplishing the state’s legitimate objectives”).
75. Id. at 10657 (citing Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison,
520 U.S. 564, 610-12 (1997) (Thomas, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J. & Scalia, J., dissenting)
(calling the application of the dormant Commerce Clause a “tangled underbrush” and “virtually
unworkable in practice”)).
76. West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 201 (1994).
77. See supra notes 79-81 and accompanying text.
78. Nathan E. Endrud, State Renewable Portfolio Standards: Their Continued
Validity and Relevance in Light of the Dormant Commerce Clause, the Supremacy
Clause, and Possible Federal Legislation, 45 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 259, 266 (2008).
79. Kenneth Starr, The Roberts Court and the Business Cases, 35 PEPP. L. REV.
541, 544-45 (2008) (stating that in the absence of federal legislation on the issue, states
have the right to act).
80. See Dep’t of Revenue v. Davis, 128 S. Ct. 1801, 1821 (2008) (Scalia, J., concurring
in part) (stating that legislators, not judges, are better at weighing the respective burdens
and benefits of legislation); United Haulers Ass’n, Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste
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states have a full right to regulate in matters of interstate commerce,
reading a more literal interpretation that the Commerce Clause has no
“dormant” effect.81 Justice Thomas has expressed his view that all state
regulations that affect interstate trade are valid until superseded by the
federal government.82 Scholars observe that Justice Scalia’s and Justice
Thomas’s positions have influenced the Court because recent dormant
Commerce Clause cases have been limited to facially discriminatory
regulations, and some of the other Justices simply attempt to avoid
confrontation with Justices Scalia and Thomas on whether nondiscriminatory laws need to undergo the Pike balancing test at all.83
Justice Breyer also tends to grant greater deference to state regulations
that affect interstate commerce, looking primarily at costs and benefits
rather than intent. He would likely allow state legislation, absent clear
evidence that a regulation heavily burdens out-of-state interests or
protects in-state interests, for the benefit of the free market.84 Similarly,
Chief Justice Roberts gives leeway to states in their regulation of goods
and services that might have an interstate impact, as long as clear
discrimination is not the impetus for the regulation.85 He went so far as
to state that the “dormant Commerce Clause is not a roving license for
federal courts to decide what activities are appropriate for state and local
government[s] to undertake[] and what activities must be the province of
private market competition,”86 evidencing a persuasion to permit state
Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330, 348 (2007) (Scalia, J., concurring in part); CTS Corp. v.
Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 95 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that the
Pike test “is ill suited to the judicial function and should be undertaken rarely if at all”);
David S. Day, The “Mature” Rehnquist Court and the Dormant Commerce Clause
Doctrine: the Expanded Discrimination Tier, 52 S.D. L. Rev. 1, 5-6 (2007).
81. United Haulers, 550 U.S. at 352 (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment) (“To the
extent that Congress does not exercise its authority to make that choice, the Constitution
does not limit the States’ power to regulate commerce. In the face of congressional silence,
the States are free to set the balance between protectionism and the free market. Instead of
accepting this constitutional reality, the Court’s negative Commerce Clause jurisprudence
gives nine Justices of this Court the power to decide the appropriate balance.”).
82. Id. (“To the extent that Congress does not exercise its authority to make that
choice, the Constitution does not limit the States’ power to regulate commerce.”) (Thomas, J.,
concurring in judgment).
83. Day, supra note 80, at 51.
84. Id. at 46 (comparing Justice Breyer’s decisions in S.-Cent. Bell Tel. Co. v.
Alabama, 526 U.S. 160, 169 (1999) and Am. Trucking Ass’n, Inc. v. Mich. Pub. Serv.
Comm’n, 545 U.S. 429, 433-36 (2005)).
85. See United Haulers, 550 U.S. at 340-47 (plurality); Kenneth L. Karst, From
Carbone to United Haulers: The Advocates’ Tales, 2007 SUP. CT. REV. 237, 276-77.
86. United Haulers, 550 U.S. at 343.
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regulations. In United Haulers, he further explained his views that state
governments are given leeway to pursue “health, safety[,] and welfare”
laws and that when those burdened are the ones that established the
regulations, such regulations are acceptable.87 However, based on his
dissent in Massachusetts v. EPA, Chief Justice Roberts appears to hold a
low opinion of environmental regulations88—particularly climate-change
regulation,89 so a dormant Commerce Clause challenge to a climatechange regulation might render Chief Justice Roberts conflicted.
Although Justice Ginsburg has not assigned herself to a particular
point of view on the application of the dormant Commerce Clause to
environmental regulations, she is often placed in the “liberal” camp that
provides leeway for the federal government to act. 90 She has
traditionally been lenient when the federal government passes a law for
general health and safety reasons, affording the federal government
broad deference to legislate.91 Similarly, Justice Stevens is also somewhat
unclear in his application.92 He applies the Pike test but would grant
deference to a state law if Congress, by its silence, has allowed it.93
These Justices face Chief Justice Roberts’s challenge, only juxtaposed:
they find environmental laws compelling, yet have reasoned so in a way
that oftentimes supports federal action over states’ rights to act.
Justice Kennedy takes a hard line on the issue and would likely strike
down a state action that has out-of-state effects. In this aspect, he is like
Justice Breyer, but Justice Kennedy’s viewpoint was influenced by his
desire to promote a national economy unfettered by individual state
regulation.94 Commentators have attributed this to a strict adherence to
the Commerce Clause and a strong belief in “antiregulatory, procompetitive
ideals,”95 but such a view not without limit.96 In Carbone, Justice Kennedy
87. Id. at 345.
88. This opinion was on display as recently as United Haulers, as Chief Justice Roberts
did not join the rest of the plurality in extolling the virtues of recycling and that the state
had full interest in increasing it. Id. at 1798. Interestingly, Justice Scalia did not join this
aspect of the decision, but did concur with the larger decision allowing the regulation. Id. at
348. It can be assumed that dormant Commerce Clause challenges with regard to climatechange regulation would receive similar treatment.
89. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 535-38 (2007) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
90. Karst, supra note 85, at 247.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 246.
93. Robert A. Schapiro, Justice Stevens’s Theory of Interactive Federalism, 74
FORDHAM L. REV. 2133, 2149-51 (2006); Jim Chen, A Vision Softly Creeping: Congressional
Acquiescence and the Dormant Commerce Clause, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1764, 1787 (2004).
94. Karst, supra note 85, at 247.
95. See Dep’t of Revenue v. Davis, 128 S. Ct. 1801, 1822 (2008) (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting); Richard H. Fallon, The “Conservative” Paths of the Rehnquist Court’s
Federalism Doctrine, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 429, 470-71 (2002); Michael C. Blumm &
Sherry L. Bosse, Justice Kennedy and the Environment: Property, State’s Rights, and a
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wrote that the garbage flow control ordinance at issue was invalid
because it attained its goal simply by “depriving competitors” of access
to the market,97 evidencing a belief that state regulations that complicate
and burden trade are examined and tested by the dormant Commerce
Clause.98 In Justice Kennedy’s view, a law’s equal application to instate and out-of-state operators does not grant the regulation a pass;
rather, he examines the law’s real-world impact on interstate trade.99
Justice Alito appears to agree, judging by his dissent in United Haulers,
and he would set the bar high to deem state infringement on interstate
commerce acceptable.100
III. DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE’S APPLICATION TO S.B. 1368
Power generators and out-of-state electricity importers are considering
bringing a lawsuit against California, claiming that S.B. 1368 violates
the dormant Commerce Clause.101 The suit is likely to come from Utah
and Wyoming power generators, as they provide a large proportion of
California’s out-of-state, coal-generated power.102 Anticipating such a

Persistent Search for Nexus, 82 WASH. L. REV. 667, 721-22 (2007) (“Kennedy’s
devotion to states’ rights apparently does not extend to what he considers to be
overregulation: while he prefers state regulation to federal regulation, he prefers one
level of regulation to two, and the market to regulation. His states’ rights advocacy may
actually be part of a larger deregulatory preference.”).
96. Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 151 (1986) (“The Commerce Clause significantly
limits the ability of States and localities to regulate or otherwise burden the flow of
interstate commerce, but it does not elevate free trade above all other values.”); Exxon
Corp. v. Governor of Md., 437 U.S. 117, 127 (1978) (stating that the Commerce Clause
does not protect “the particular structure or method of operation” of a market).
97. C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 386 (1994).
98. Id. at 391 (“In this light, the flow control ordinance is just one more instance of
local processing requirements that we have long held invalid.”).
99. Id. (“The ordinance is no less discriminatory because in-state or in-town
processors are also covered by the prohibition.”).
100. See generally Dep’t of Revenue v. Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1822-23; Karst, supra
note 85, at 277-79; Evan Sauer, Case Note, United Haulers Ass’n, Inc. v. OneidaHerkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 127 S. Ct. 1786, 34 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 671 (2008).
101. Marc Lifsher, Cutting Through Haze of Governor’s Stance on Coal, L.A.
T IMES , Dec. 12, 2005, at C-1, available at http://articles.latimes.com/2005/dec/12/
business/fi-coal12.
102. Letter from Wyo. Infrastructure Auth. to the Cal. Energy Comm’n (Oct. 5,
2005), available at http://www.wyia.org/Docs/Comments/CA%20Comments%2010-0505.pdf (discussing rule-making of S.B. 1368 standards).
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challenge, S.B. 1368’s drafters included some findings and evidence to
counteract the interstate effects.103
A. An Effect, but Discriminatory?
The first step in applying the dormant Commerce Clause test is to
determine whether the state law is facially discriminatory.104 Judged
alone, S.B. 1368 will burden out-of-state, coal-fired power plants more
than in-state power plants.105 At the outset, S.B. 1368 parallels the
regulation that the Court struck down in Washington Apple due to its
out-of-state burden, but permitted as facially non-discriminatory in
Clover Leaf. 106 An important aspect of this analysis is whether a court
would hold that S.B. 1368 applies differently to in-state and out-of-state
power or whether it delineates between coal and renewable power. If it
is the former, S.B. 1368 will be struck down; if it is the latter, it will
move on to the second part of the Pike test.
A clear intent to protect in-state residents is required to show facial
discrimination when a court applies the Pike test.107 The California
legislature and Public Utilities Commission (PUC) included findings,
which are likely to be given deference in an extraterritoriality finding,
that S.B. 1368’s purpose was to regulate the carbon emitted in the
process of generating power for California.108 The support documents
will be essential to a ruling that impacts on interstate trade are
unintentional and merely a by-product of worthwhile legislation.109 The
Los Angeles Department of Water and Power (DWP) has shown
evidence of this non-discriminatory purpose by signing a contract for
renewable power from Utah, the very same state whose coal contracts
would be limited by S.B. 1368.110 California is not attempting to isolate
103. See S.B.1368, 2005-2006 (Cal. 2006) (providing reasoning behind the law).
104. See supra Part I(a).
105. Brian H. Potts, Regulating Greenhouse Gas ‘Leakage‘: How California Can
Evade The Impending Constitutional Attacks, 43 ELECTRICITY J. 19, 46 (2006).
106. Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 472-74 (1981); Hunt v.
Wash. State Apple Adver. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 352-54 (1977).
107. See Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Md., 437 U.S. 117, 126 (1978). “The fact that
the burden of a state regulation falls on some interstate companies does not, by itself,
establish a claim of discrimination against interstate commerce.” Id. Rather, if the regulation’s
goal is to “place added costs,” then it is a violation. See id.
108. CAL. PUB. UTILITIES COMM’N, POLICY STATEMENT ON GREENHOUSE GAS
PERFORMANCE STANDARDS (2005), http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/word_pdf/REPORT/50432.pdf
(“[T]o have any meaningful impact . . . GHG emissions reduction goals must be applied
to the State’s electricity consumption, not just the State’s electricity production . . . .”).
109. See supra Part I.
110. CITY OF L.A. DEP’T OF WATER AND POWER, 2007 INTEGRATED RESOURCES
PLAN, at D-14 & 15. This is similar to the rationale in Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co.,
449 U.S. 456, 472-74 (1981).
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itself from a problem111 or give a benefit to only in-state power
producers,112 so it is considered unlikely that a court would apply a strict
scrutiny test.113 Much like the ruling in Clover Leaf, S.B. 1368 is not
facially discriminatory because it does not differentiate between out-ofstate and in-state power; rather, it draws the line on GHG emissions.114
B. In the Balancing Test
Assuming that S.B. 1368 will not be found to be facially
discriminatory, a court will then have to weigh the impact on interstate
commerce against the value of S.B. 1368 to California.115 As described
in Pike, “If a legitimate local purpose is found, then the question
becomes one of degree. And the extent of the burden that will be tolerated
will of course depend on the nature of the local interest involved . . . ”116
The main issues in this application will be whether there are other, better
options to regulate GHG, whether GHG reductions are a “local interest,”
and whether potential GHG reductions outweigh the burden that the outof-state coal industry will face.

111. C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 392-94 (1994)
(restating that in the waste-disposal cases the Court looked on any state regulation
aiming to insulate itself from the interstate market in garbage with a jaundiced eye).
112. See supra notes 103, 108 and accompanying text, evidencing a purpose to limit
GHG emissions, not affect interstate power trading. While all coal burning plants are
out-of-state, only half of California’s out-of-state power sources would be effected by
S.B. 1368, evidencing that something besides geography was the determining factor. See
N YBERG ET AL ., supra note 24, at 5. This determination will also rest on facialdiscrimination finding and whether or not the Court finds the purpose to be valid.
113. Kysar & Meyler, supra note 22, at 1666; Patricia Weisselberg, Shaping the
Energy Future in the American West: Can California Curb Greenhouse Gas Emissions
from Out-of-State, Coal-Fired Power Plants Without Violating the Dormant Commerce
Clause?, 42 U.S.F. L. REV. 185, 219 (2007); Peter Carl Nordberg, Comment, Excuse Me,
Sir, But Your Climate’s on Fire: California’s S.B. 1368 and the Dormant Commerce
Clause, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2067, 2083-84 (2007).
114. Endrud, supra note 78, at 271-272; Farber, supra, note 36, at 894; Weisselberg, supra
note 113, at 208-09; Potts, supra, note 105, at 4; Nordberg, supra note 113, at 2083-84;
Yvonne Gross, Note, Kyoto, Congress, or Bust: The Constitutional Invalidity of State
CO2 Cap-and-Trade Programs, 28 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 205, 225 (2005).
115. Some current Supreme Court Justices have rejected this analysis. See supra
Part I(b).
116. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) (stating that the Court will
strike down a law if it “the burden imposed on [interstate] commerce is clearly excessive
in relation to the putative local benefits”).
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1. Best Available Option
In determining whether or not S.B. 1368 is the best available option to
California, a court would look to whether California is actually pursuing
the best path towards its purported goal of lessening the State’s GHG
emissions.117 Expecting such a challenge, California legislators included
reasoning for the law in its text that they are “protecting the state against
financial and reliability risks . . .”118 and that S.B. 1368 “will reduce
potential financial risk to California consumers for future pollutioncontrol costs.”119 These rationales rely on an understanding that future
carbon emission laws will require GHG cuts, which is increasingly
likely.120 Determining whether S.B. 1368 is the best option will require
a weighing of the state interest in GHG regulation and a determination of
California’s intent in passing S.B. 1368.121 In this case, the legislative
history evidences intent to attack global warming, a problem that is
currently addressed solely by reducing GHG emissions.
Out-of-state power generators would likely argue that S.B. 1368 puts
too large of a burden on utilities by failing to limit the State’s
transportation sector’s GHG inputs. Roughly 30% of California’s GHG
emissions come from transportation,122 and any plan that ignores these
emissions is opening itself up for a challenge on unfairly targeting one
industry. However, because S.B. 1368 was passed along with other state
regulations on automobile GHG emissions,123 it is likely that a court
would find that the overall regulatory scheme was to lessen carbon
emissions, not punish an out-of-state industry. This follows a recent
Supreme Court decision upholding a tax break scheme to benefit in-state
bonds in which the statutory package was examined as a whole and not

117. See supra Part II(a).
118. California Bill on GHG Standard for Power Purchases Hits Snags, CLEAN AIR
REP. (Wash., D.C.), May 18, 2006, available at 2006 WLNR 8469898.
119. S. 1368, 2005-2006 § 1(i) (Cal. 2006) (also including reasoning that they were
protecting against “future reliability problems in electricity supplies,” id. § 1(j)).
120. This is due to changes in the federal government and climate-change policy as
a whole. Zachary Coile, Climate Change Remains a Top Priority, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 30,
2008, at A-6, available at http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2008/11/30/MNJ
T14EFDT.DTL.
121. Compare with the intention relating the garbage regulation struck down in City
of Phila. v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 627-28 (1978). The ban on out-of-state trash in
City of Philadelphia is by definition different from a CO standard put on all power (both
in-state and out-of-state).
122. CALIFORNIA AIR RESOURCES BOARD, CLIMATE CHANGE SCOPING P LAN
APPENDICES: VOLUME I: SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS AND MEASURE DETAIL, at F-7 tbl.3
(2008), available at http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/scopingplan/document/appendices_volume1.pdf.
123. There have been two other bills limiting emissions from cars. Assemb. 32,
2005-2006 (Cal. 2006); S. 1493, 2001-2002 (Cal. 2002).
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piecemeal.124 Furthermore, California allows for alternative methods for
coal-fired power plants to meet the new requirements, including
allowances for plants to sequester carbon emissions,125 evidencing a
GHG-reduction goal, not an intention to burden out-of-state power. In
evaluating these two arguments, it is likely that a court would rule that
S.B. 1368 is the best solution to the goal of lessening California’s GHG
emissions.
2. Legitimate Local Purpose
In order to pass the Pike test, California will have to show a strong
local interest in preventing the effects of global warming.
Commentators have challenged whether preventing climate change is
appropriately categorized as a “local” state interest,126 and the issue has
not been settled in court. Massachusetts v. EPA is instructive, as it shed
light on the Court’s opinion on the climate-change regulations127 and
adjudged a state’s interest in preventing climate change as a whole.
However, because it did not rule on a state law regulating GHG
emissions, any application to S.B. 1368 would require a logical jump.
In Mass. v. EPA, the Court ruled that Massachusetts had standing to
challenge the EPA’s refusal to regulate GHGs because the State faced a
threat from climate change “concrete” enough to show harm.128 The
Court found that a state or person could not be denied standing to redress
harm simply because the harm is on a large scale.129 From this ruling, it
124. Dep’t of Revenue v. Davis, 128 S. Ct. 1801, 1813-14 (2008) (ruling that the
Court would not look at Kentucky’s conduct solely through the action at hand, but would
examine Kentucky’s bond-and-tax system as applied to in-state and out-of-state interests
in deciding whether the Kentucky tax violated the dormant Commerce Clause or fit into
the market participant exception).
125. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 8341(e)(6) (West 2009) (creating an exception for
“permanently disposed” carbon dioxide “in geological formations in compliance with
applicable laws and regulations”).
126. Gross, supra note 114, at 222-229. Gross also makes the case that laws like
S.B. 1368 violate the Foreign Affairs Power and the Supremacy Clause. Id. at 229-35.
However, her article came out before Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007), was
decided and before S.B. 1368 was enacted.
127. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 516-25 (discussing standing and causation
required for states to force action on global warming).
128. Id. at 517. The majority appeared to give extra credence to the standing because
the challenger was a state, a theory maligned by Chief Justice Roberts. Id. at 548-49
(Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
129. Id. at 526 n.24 (“‘To deny standing to persons who are in fact injured simply
because many others are also injured simply because many others are also injured,

305

ADAMS (DO NOT DELETE)

2/1/2016 9:26 AM

is clear that the Court values a state’s right to challenge an
administrative decision not to regulate GHGs, noting that the relatively
limited “local” interests that Massachusetts had in protecting its
coastline from sea-level rise were not too small to deny the state an
interest in spurring federal action.130 This would lead to an inference
that California’s interest in preventing sea-level rise and problems with
the state water supply would be given weight by the Court.131
This weight, however, has only been proven to show that a state has
the right to challenge federal inaction; the Court said nothing about
whether this right extended to give a state the right to regulate GHGs on
its own, as S.B. 1368 does. The dissent’s opinion, that the state failed to
meet the redressability requirement because of the limited scope of U.S.
GHG reductions,132 would seem to be more relevant in a case involving
the relatively small-scale action of a state. It is unsettled whether this
reasoning would draw over any Justices from the majority in
Massachusetts v. EPA, which could upend the 5-4 decision and
invalidate the weight that the Court gave to state interest in preventing
climate change.133
Beyond the scale issues of a state acting on climate change, there are
questions related to the value assigned to local environmental
regulations that affect interstate commerce.134 Commentators, citing
West Lynn Creamery,135 have claimed that the purpose of limiting GHGs
is not to be given much weight in the Pike test.136 While the value
assigned to an environmental regulation is necessarily subjective, in
West Lynn Creamery, the Court found the state’s environmental purpose
to be lacking, if not entirely made up.137 How the Court would rule in
the case of a substantive environmental purpose is unclear, but the ruling
in West Lynn Creamery illustrates only how the Court will rule on a

would mean that the most injurious and widespread Government actions could be
questioned by nobody.’”) (quoting United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory
Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669, 687-88 (1973)).
130. Id.. at 521-24 (“Agencies, like legislatures, do not generally resolve massive
problems in one fell regulatory swoop.”). Chief Justice Roberts disagreed completely.
Id. at 544-47 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
131. Farber, supra note 36, at 897.
132. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 545-46 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (writing
that the weak causation link leads to an even weaker claim that the state can require
national action, as even national action would not necessarily stem the loss of
Massachusetts’s coastline.).
133. Most important to this analysis are the judges dormant Commerce Clause theories,
outlined supra in Part I(B).
134. MacDougald, supra note 23, at 1441-43.
135. West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 204-05 (1994).
136. MacDougald, supra note 23, at 1443.
137. West Lynn Creamery, 512 U.S. at 205 n.20.
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baseless and clearly inadequate environmental purpose and does not
extend to a substantive claim with legislative findings.
3. Rationally Related
As a part of the Pike test, the Court must also find that S.B. 1368 is
“rationally related” to the goal of preventing the harms of climate
change.138 Most illustrative of this point is Washington Apple, where the
Court found that additional labeling on apples was not rationally related
to food safety; rather, the intention of the law was entirely to benefit instate apple growers.139 In an S.B. 1368 challenge, it will be much harder
for California to prove the necessity of the regulation if it is seen as an
attempt to provide a blueprint for federal legislation or has a purpose
other than limiting GHG emissions.140 Some commentators have actually
gone so far to state that California has, knowingly or not, “hit the
regulatory sweet spot” for inducing federal action on GHGs, as power
generators are potentially facing inconsistent and costly state regulations
of their carbon emissions.141 If a court finds that California’s intention in
passing S.B. 1368 was solely to provide a blueprint or create uncertainty,
the State’s action will likely be found to be unrelated to the goal
of preventing the harms of climate change.142 If the Court accepts the
legislative and agency findings that S.B. 1368 is meant to lessen the
effects of climate change in California, ensure electricity reliability, and
modernize California’s electric infrastructure at face value, then the
rational relationship required by the Pike test should be satisfied.
4. Extraterritoriality
In a potential complaint, it is likely that any S.B. 1368 challenger
would emphasize the “extraterritoriality” ruling in Brown-Forman Distillers
Corp. v. N.Y. State Liquor Authority, which struck down a regulation
138. See supra Part I(a).
139. Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Adver. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 352-54 (1977).
140. Kysar & Meyler, supra note 22, at 1669; Chemerinsky et al., supra note 74, at
10,659.
141. J.R. DeShazo & Jody Freeman, Timing and Form of Federal Regulation: The
Case of Climate Change, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1499, 1533-34 (2007).
142. Farber, supra note 36, at 897 (citing Proctor & Gamble Co. v. City of Chicago,
509 F.2d 69, 81 (7th Cir. 1975), cert denied, 421 U.S. 978 (1975) (ruling that providing
an example to other communities was an acceptable rationale for the City of Chicago to
affect interstate commerce)).
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that limited its application to in-state liquor sellers, but effectively
regulated prices in nearby states.143 At issue in the “extraterritorial” test
is whether the state “directly controls” commerce “wholly outside the
boundaries of a state”144 The Brown-Foreman court saw no rationale for
the New York law beyond simple economic protection of in-state residents,
which evidenced facial discrimination,145 a situation not present in the
analysis of S.B. 1368. When applying this test, a court should take into
account that California is not regulating a transaction that takes place
entirely out-of-state and, in writing S.B. 1368, had intentions more
legitimate interests than protecting in-state businesses.146
C. The Market Participant Doctrine
The dormant Commerce Clause has one notable applicable exception:
the market participant doctrine. Under this exception, states have full
right to pass any rule, standard, requirement or guideline that governs
their actions within a marketplace, as long as they are acting solely as
market participants and not as regulators.147 The Supreme Court first
acknowledged the market participant doctrine in 1976 when it ruled that
Maryland could discriminate against out-of-state scrap dealers because
the State was creating a market for abandoned cars in buying in-state
cars, not just regulating their removal.148 Regulations limiting sales
from a state cement factory to state residents149 and placing quotas on
city residents working on city projects150 have been upheld when the
state was buying and selling in the market. This does not extend to state
requirements on “downstream” activities beyond the state’s control as a
buyer or seller,151 or when the state is not pursuing a traditional state
participatory role in the market.152
A recent Ninth Circuit case supports the proposition that a market
participant exception could be used for publicly owned utilities to follow
S.B. 1368. In Engine Manufacturing Ass’n v. South Coast Air Quality

143. Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 58184 (1986).
144. Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 336 (1989).
145. Id. at 336-37; Brown-Forman, 476 U.S. at 583.
146. The rationale is discussed supra in Part II(a).
147. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
148. Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 803, 809-10 (1976).
149. See Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 440 (1980).
150. White v. Mass. Council of Const. Employers, Inc., 460 U.S. 204, 206-08 (1983).
151. S.-Cent. Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 93 (1984).
152. See Dep’t of Revenue v. Davis, 128 S. Ct. 1801, 1809-11 (2008). The line between
“downstream” and “traditional” actions lies between the timber-processing requirements
on Alaska state forests in Wunnicke and the waste-processing guidelines of United Haulers.
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Management District (SCAQMD),153 the Ninth Circuit ruled that the Air
Quality Management District was acting as a market participant when it
required governmental agencies of all levels to stock their vehicle fleets
with hybrid and low-emission cars.154 Although the Court remanded the
case for full examination on different grounds, it was a signal that when
the state, or any subdivision,155 is buying or selling in a market, it can
include restrictions and qualifiers, regardless of their effect on interstate
commerce. 156 Furthermore, it found the Air Quality Management
District to be acting as a participant when it regulated the type of
vehicles that governmental agencies could purchase, not limiting its
reach to its own District purchases.157
For utilities enacting standards from S.B. 1368 to gain exemption
under the market participant doctrine, the court would have to rule that
the utility is a market participant. The regulating authorities (PUC,
California Energy Commission [CEC], California Air Resources Board
[CARB] amongst others involved in application of California’s climatechange laws) are not market participants. Privately owned utilities are
also not governmental entities. Publicly owned utilities, however, do
qualify as market participants because they are technically government
entities and participate in the market as buyers, sellers and generators.
The Los Angeles Department of Water and Power (DWP) and all
smaller publicly owned utilities in the State could impose nearly any
regulation or standard, no matter whether it is in violation of the dormant
Commerce Clause, because DWP’s actions within the marketplace are
those of a participant, not a regulator.158 DWP is a department within
the City of Los Angeles, which means that it functions more like an
agency or an arm of government.159 This is distinct from California’s
two other major utilities, San Diego Gas & Electric and Pacific Gas and
Electric, which are privately owned and operated. DWP’s status as a

153. 498 F.3d 1031 (9th Cir. 2007). This case was decided in the Ninth Circuit, has
not, as of publishing time, been submitted to the Supreme Court for cert., and has not yet
returned to the District Court.
154. Id. at 1039-1042.
155. Big Country Foods, Inc. v. Board of Education of Anchorage, 952 F.2d 1173,
1179-80 (9th Cir. 1992).
156. SCAQMD, 498 F.3d at 1039.
157. Id. at 1045-46.
158. See Farber, supra note 36, at 896.
159. Los Angeles Department of Water & Power, Our Service and History,
http://www.ladwp.com/ladwp/cms/ladwp000508.jsp (last visited Nov. 11, 2009).
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municipal utility gives it the freedom to undertake any contractual
obligations its Commissioners and CEO think wise, and for interstate
commerce purposes, it is treated as any other business. According to
precedent that looks for “direct state participation in the market,” DWP
and all smaller public utilities should meet the participation burden as
they buy, sell, and own the means to generate power.160
Arguments have been made for switching to a system where all utility
electricity passes through the State’s control so that California can avail
itself of the exception.161 However, this system seems unlikely as it
would give near complete control over the electricity market to the
State—a situation that is unpopular amongst consumers, regulators, and
utilities alike.162 Furthermore, while commentators have discussed the
possibility of gaining the market participant exception by treating carbon
credits as a good,163 this seems like an untenable solution because the
Court has stated that it examines a state’s participation in the market, not
just the good’s presence.164 The current structure of the California
electricity market affords the market participant doctrine exception to
DWP but does not extend to the other utilities in the State. This is a
notable exception, as DWP provides power for nearly 1.5 million homes
and businesses and produces over 26 billion kilowatt-hours.165

160. See Dep’t of Revenue v. Davis, 128 S. Ct. 1801, 1810 (2008) (selling bonds is
a traditional state purpose); Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 803, 80910 (1976) (buying Maryland scrap cars created a market that the state participated in, so
interstate effects were unimportant); Farber, supra note 36, at 896. While the regulation
is coming from the state, DWP’s exemption is valid. See Treg A. Julander, State Resident
Preference Statutes and the Market Participant Exception to the Dormant Commerce
Clause, 24 WHITTIER L. REV. 541, 579 (2002).
161. Potts, supra note 105, at 9-10 (citing A.B. 1X, a law passed during the
California energy crisis that gave the state control over utilities, and arguing that this
would give the state complete coverage under the market participant doctrine).
162. Id. at 10. Also, after the energy crisis of the early 2000s, the state is unlikely
to attempt to enter the electricity market in such an active way.
163. Kysar & Meyler, supra note 22, at 1658-61. Much like in Alexandria Scrap,
California’s regulation has the effect of altering the market, but in an acceptable way.
As Maryland was “entered into the market to bid up the price,” California has ordered
the PUC to bid up the price of renewable power.
164. See supra Part II(a). This is also a form model application, but likely to be
applied only when making the credits “goods” themselves because of a clear intent to
regulate the market, not participate in it.
165. Los Angeles Department of Power and Water, Power System Facts in Brief,
http://www.ladwp.com/ladwp/cms/ladwp001517.jsp.
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IV. PREDICTIONS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
FOR CLIMATE LEGISLATION
A. Potential Challenges
If a case challenging S.B. 1368 is brought to the Supreme Court, a
ruling will undoubtedly be split. Testing S.B. 1368 for a dormant
Commerce Clause violation includes enough variables to make predicting
potential rulings difficult. It can be assumed that such a case will result
in two major splits in the Supreme Court: on the dormant Commerce
Clause and on the value of public health and environmental regulations.
Justices Kennedy and Alito are likely to see S.B. 1368 as invalid, as they
have consistently ruled that the dormant Commerce Clause exists
primarily to create a free and open market, and that a regulation
impacting the movement of an article of interstate commerce is given
little weight in the Pike test. Equally as likely, Justices Thomas and
Scalia will rule in favor of upholding S.B. 1368. While their dissent in
Massachusetts v. EPA leads one to believe that they would assign little
value to a state regulating GHGs to prevent what they called a global
problem,166 this analysis would be preempted because valuation of the
law is done in the Pike balancing test, something both Justices Thomas
and Scalia regard as an improper application of the Constitution. Justice
Breyer is also likely to uphold S.B. 1368, as he looks primarily for
differential treatment based on geography to invalidate a state regulation.
Predicting the rulings of Justices Roberts, Stevens, and Ginsburg, is
imperfect, as all would come to their decisions using different paths.
Chief Justice Roberts would likely weigh the desire to allow states to
regulate against a climate-change threat he called into question in
Massachusetts v. EPA,167 while allowing for state environmental regulations
as he did in United Haulers.168 Justices Stevens and Ginsburg would
likely weigh the value they assigned state climate-change laws in their
standing ruling in Massachusetts v. EPA against their desire for national
standards in what is clearly a global issue. Though a specific vote
prediction is difficult and speculative at best, one can predict that S.B.
1368 would be upheld by the current Supreme Court.
166. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 549-60 (2007) (Scalia, J., joined by Thomas,
J., dissenting).
167. Id. at 535-38 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
168. United Haulers Ass’n, Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550
U.S. 330, 345 (2007); see also supra note 58 and accompanying text.
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B. Cooperative Federalism
The interplay of state and federal law on climate change is not yet
settled, although attendees of the 2009 Energy and Climate Law Journal
Symposium at the University of San Diego generally expect that the
legislation coming from current discussions will be one of cooperative
federalism.169 Cooperative federalism is the concept that state, federal,
and local governments work together, often with federal regulations
providing a minimum level of protection, with states given the power to
enact stronger standards.170 The best example in the environmental field
is the Clean Air Act,171 as the federal Environmental Protection Agency
sets a national standard but leaves it up to the states to develop the best
way to attain such standards. In this way, state plans are adopted as
federal law so that localized policy decisions carry the weight and
extend a federal law’s reach and adaptability. Under this regime, state
and local governments can utilize site-specific and particularized
knowledge while making the most of the heft and enforcement power of
the federal government. The federal government applies a “floor,” or
minimum standard, while it allows states to enact a “ceiling,” or more
stringent level of protection.172
Under such a system, the economics of a cap-and-trade system
become complex because the two caps would theoretically operate in the
same sphere. Developing a carbon regulatory system is complex
enough, but combining state and regional cap-and-trade systems will
lead to complications. In a state with a more stringent carbon emissions
regulatory scheme, emission credits utilized under the federal program
are pushed out-of-state, much like under the leakage concept, because
the credits become unusable in that state, but fully valid under the

169. This inference was taken from speeches and conversations held at the Symposium
on Feb. 20, 2009.
170. Jonathan Binder & Jared Snyder, The Changing Climate of Cooperative
Federalism: The Dynamic Role of the States in a National Strategy to Combat Climate
Change, 27 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 231, 233 (2009).
171. Holly Doremus & W. Michael Hanemann, Of Babies and Bathwater: Why the
Clean Air Act’s Cooperative Federalism Framework Is Useful for Addressing Global
Warming¸ 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 799, 817 (2008).
172. The last failed federal bill, the Lieberman-Warner Climate Security Act of 2007, S.
2191, 110th Cong. (2008), specifically granted states the rights to regulate carbon emissions,
but gave them no role in the regulatory structure. The federal cap was still most important,
and for all purposes, the overall cap. If this situation is duplicated in upcoming bills, then
states that do further limit carbon emissions will see regulated industries and
power production moving out-of-state, only to sell the same power back. This is exactly
why federal legislation has to allow for states to regulate based upon consumption levels,
not just production.
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federal cap.173 This results in state laws simply moving emissions, not
actually reducing them, because the important cap is still the federal one,
not the state program.174 Addressing this problem by “sealing off” states
as caps unto themselves destroys the entire economic benefit of a
national cap-and-trade market by creating fifty separated markets, and is
thus a poor solution.175
The main thrust of any potential solution should be to allow states to
hold themselves to higher standards than federal law but to do so in a
way that eliminates emissions rather than simply moving them out-ofstate. For example, if California wants to cut the emissions it is responsible
for, while paying the higher per kilowatt hour fee or increased taxes, it
should be able to do so.
Under any cooperative federalism regulatory model, the only way for
California to actually affect lower emissions as a state would be to pass
laws that regulate what is consumed in-state rather than solely what is
produced in-state.176 This becomes clear if California is given direct
control over the allotment of carbon emissions in a federal program that
correlate with the amount of carbon it is responsible for.177 If the federal
floor is distributed by the federal government, California reductions are
sold elsewhere. But if California is allotted its carbon credits under the
federal system and has the authority to withhold a number of credits to
set up its own set of carbon reductions, then the overall net emissions of
GHGs should be lowered. If federal law fails to allow for state laws that
address in-state consumption, these early actors will be put at a
disadvantage as federal law becomes the floor—not legally, but in the
economics of the system. If federal law is going to follow the
cooperative federalism model, the only way it can do so under the
constraints of a global problem, is to allow states to regulate every joule,
watt, and gallon of gas consumed in the state, rather than just those

173. This concept is explained and explored in MEGHAN MCGUINNESS & A. DENNY
ELLERMAN, THE EFFECTS AND INTERACTIONS BETWEEN FEDERAL AND STATE CLIMATE
POLICIES, ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY 175, 199-200, Dec., 2008.
174. This assumes that the federal program would set a cap and then apportion the
permits themselves instead of giving them to the state to apportion or retire as they see fit.
175. See MCGUINNESS & ELLERMAN, supra note 173, at 210-11 (explaining that
state-by-state caps deny the flexibility for a market-based system to find the
cheapest pollution reductions).
176. California consumes much more energy than it produces, which is pretty much
true for everything else except food stuffs and entertainment.
177. This is further explored and explained in Kaswan, supra note 9, at Part II(B).
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produced in-state. And if the goal is to reduce GHG emissions and grant
states some level of control in the system, dividing credits for allocation
by the states is key to any program’s success.178
V. CONCLUSION
Potential future lawsuits brought to strike S.B. 1368 as a violation of
the dormant Commerce Clause are likely to fail. The law itself does not
treat in-state and out-of-state power differently, drawing dividing lines
based on emissions not geography, so S.B. 1368 is likely not facially
discriminatory. In the Pike test, the “legitimate local purpose” question
is less clear, but if Massachusetts v. EPA is extended, the State’s
standing requirements will be met, which will likely lead to a court
giving state climate-change regulations great weight. While standing to
force federal action does not necessarily equate to a finding of sufficient
local interest, the two are logically related enough that a strong argument
can be made. Even without Massachusetts v. EPA lending itself to a
finding of a full, legitimate local interest, it is likely that courts would
find S.B. 1368 to be the best available option to California to address the
State’s legitimate interest in stemming carbon emissions and providing
incentives to businesses to do the same.
Simply because S.B. 1368 would likely be upheld, does not make it
the best solution. State-level action is an awkward fit for climate-change
regulation because states cannot sign agreements with foreign countries
and cannot go beyond their borders in their regulations. However, in the
absence of federal legislation on an issue of such importance, states have
had to fill the void, and the work they have done should not be negated
by federal law. The role for California in the federal structure is to be,
as Justice Brandeis said, a “laborator[y] of democracy”179 and provide an
example, good or bad, for national action. This role is unlikely to go
away, particularly as the common theory on forthcoming federal climate
laws is that they will create a cooperative federalism system. Such a
system, in allowing the federal government to set the floor and states to
set their own ceilings, has the most potential to produce a comprehensive
and worthwhile climate policy for the nation, but only if it is done
correctly. And only if states are allowed to enforce laws that tend to
their consumption, not just production, as S.B. 1368 does.

178. See id. at Part V for why federal standards should be distributed to the states
for state-induced reductions to result in an actual net reductions of GHGs.
179. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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